This Ghibelline *sirventes* dates from 1268 and celebrates the famous expedition to Italy of Conradian, the young heir to the Hohenstaufen dynasty, claimant to the imperial crown, challenger to Pope Clement IV and his ally Charles of Anjou, and object of a political crusade against Christians. Bitterly anticlerical, anti-Angevin and anti-French, it conveys the vehement emotions aroused by the period’s tumultuous conflicts, and more specifically the appalled and outraged reactions of a partisan public to particular events.

From 1254 to 1343 crusades were waged in Italy in defence of the temporal power of the papacy. During the period 1254 to 1302 the papal Curia «was fighting to enforce and then to maintain its claims to sovereignty in the Papal State and to suzerainty in the Kingdom of Sicily against Manfred and Conradian of Staufen and the Aragonese kings and princes who inherited the Staufen claim to the Regno».¹ In August 1258 Manfred succeeded in having himself crowned King of Sicily in Palermo, and by the end of 1261 he was a significant threat to the Papal State. In 1262 and 1263 Pope Urban IV authorized nego-

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tiations to transfer the Sicilian Crown to Charles of Anjou, a project designated from the start as a crusade, and in May 1264 the papal legate Simon of Brie was sent to France to conclude these negotiations and organize the preaching there. «The Angevin army set out from Lyons in October 1265 to march to Rome. It recruited substantial Guelf contingents en route and joined Charles of Anjou in Rome about 15 January 1266, a few days after his coronation as King of Sicily in St Peter’s. Desperately short of money, Charles began the invasion at once, and was fortunate enough both to defeat and kill his rival at the battle of Benevento on 26 February». In 1267-1268 Conrad IV’s young son Conradian attempted to regain control of the Regno, but was captured and executed at the battle of Tagliacozzo on 23 August 1268.2

The most significant work on the historical circumstances of Calega’s sirventes was carried out by Jeanroy and, jointly, Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora in 1903; De Bartholomaeis, writing in 1931, concurs with Jeanroy’s dating and repeats details of his archival sources. There is much here of value, but also much that is confusing. The following discussion attempts to clarify some of their arguments in the light of a new critical edition of the text and more recent historical and other research.3

In stanza I the troubadour vengefully anticipates the triumph of Conradian (v. 65) and the imminent downfall of the papal party which has neglected the Holy Land to wage crusade in Tuscany and Lombardy. Jeanroy relates the reference to Lombardy to events of 1265, when the French army under Robert de Béthune went to support Charles’s claims in central Italy and committed numerous atrocities in the land between Bergamo and Mantua: in Capriolo a French soldier was hanged by the inhabitants, who were massacred, including women

2 See Housley, The Italian Crusades, pp. 18-19, and my edition of BdT 439.1 on Rialto, especially for the role of Simon of Brie.

and children. A similar slaughter took place in the small town of Montechiaro. Tuscany also suffered cruelly, particularly during 1267-1268. As Condradin approached, nearly all the towns of the province declared themselves on his side. The tactics of Charles’s generals, who had insufficient forces to risk pitched battles, was to lay waste the countryside or suburbs of hostile towns: Siena was pillaged in 1267, with the worst treatment meted out to the surroundings of Florence, which Guy of Montfort entered on 17 April 1267. Some 800 Ghibellines took refuge in the castle of Sant’Ellero (v. 37), where nearly all were massacred. The Pope Clement IV even wrote to Charles to blame the excesses of the French troops. Stanza V contrasts the cruelty which Charles’s French soldiers inflicted on the Christian occupants of this fortress with the clemency Charles and his brother King Louis IX experienced at the hands of the Turks when they were taken prisoner at the battle of Mansurah on 5 April 1250.

In v. 7 the troubadour refers to a truce with ‘Turks and Persians’. Jeanroy thought there was no evidence that the papacy in the years preceding 1268 concluded any peace with Moslem powers and that Calega was simply wrong. He himself introduces some confusion here. Firstly, he claims that Antioch had fallen, though as this happened on May 18-20 1268 this is hardly compatible with his dating of Calega’s sirventes to April or May and before Charles of Anjou’s siege of Lucera on 20 May (see below). There was in fact a one-year truce made between Baibars and the Christians of Acre after the fall of Antioch on 18-20 May 1268, but this is probably too late for the likely dating of the sirventes. Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora point to a ten-year truce concluded between Baibars and Philippe de Montfort, lord of Tyre, and the Knights of St John at Markab, in the summer of 1267, and argue that this was known to the Genoese: at the end of August, a Genoese fleet landed at Tyre, but had to turn for home after being attacked and defeated by Venetian ships, so that by 1267 the Genoese would have had the latest news of the Sultan’s attacks on the Christian states and the disunity among the eastern Christians that forced them

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to make peace with the Turks. Secondly, Jeanroy is wrong to claim that Europe was threatened with a Tartar invasion, for the Tartars were actually allies of James the Conqueror against the Turks at this time, and on friendly terms with the papacy (see below).

Why Persians? Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora remark that it is unclear whether Calega really meant ‘Persians’ or whether he was referring to the Mongols. However, as they concede, relations between the papacy and the Mongols had been rather positive in recent years, partly because they shared a common enemy in Baibars, and also because of the Mongol leaders’ Nestorian Christian connections, their tolerance of others’ religious beliefs and practices, and the vain hope on the part of the papacy that they would convert to Christianity. Perhaps the troubadour is alluding to the Persian sect of the Assassins, who «were grateful to the Sultan, whose conquests freed them from the necessity of paying tribute to the Hospital, and they strongly resented the Frankish negotiations with the Mongols, who had destroyed their headquarters in Persia». As Asperti notes, Calega’s piece echoes elements from Ricaut Bonomel’s *sirventes*, which also refers to Persians, but there they were victims of the Turks, whereas here they are their allies.

As for ‘killing French and Germans’, although the Genoese troubadour is hostile to the French elsewhere (vv. 16, 39, 74, 79), since the French are the soldiers of Charles of Anjou, and the Germans, of Conradin, here he blames the clergy for deaths on both sides of the Guelf-Ghibelline conflict.

Stanza II begins with a sarcastic jibe at papal promotion of scheming legates, another echo of Bonomel’s *sirventes* three years earlier, though not this time with Simon de Brie in mind. Jeanroy argues that

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9 Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora, «Ein Sirventes von 1268», p. 626, n. 3, and see the notes to my edition of Ricaut Bonomel on *Rialto*.
behind the generalisation lurks a specific target, a certain G…, Bishop of Bethlehem, subsequently identified by De Bartholomaeis as «Galhard d’Oursault», a Dominican appointed as pontifical legate on 25 January 1268 to intervene in political infighting in Cremona.\footnote{Jeanroy, «Un sirventes», pp. 252-255; De Bartholomaeis, \textit{Poesie provenzali}, pp. 251-252, n. 12.} Jeanroy notes that the Ghibellines had long held sway there, as they had in Florence, and had abused their power to exile their opponents. But just as in Florence the Guelfs, once having regained the upper hand, were soon to tear each other apart, in Cremona the two Ghibelline leaders fell out, and one of these, Boso of Dovara, expelled the other, the famous Oberto Pallavicini. This was the point when Pope Clement IV sent this legate to Cremona, who arranged for the exiled Guelfs to be allowed back to the city. Shortly after this, when a sedition was artificially provoked, it was Boso who in turn had to quit the town, and in fear of his enemies he took refuge in a fortress which he managed to leave under the protection of a band of mercenaries to lead a vagabond life until his death. Jeanroy suggests that the troubadour was echoing laments of exiles and their descendants dispersed throughout the Italian peninsula.

Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora point to earlier machinations on the part of legates in Cremona, and their details differ somewhat from those of Jeanroy. They relate that in July 1266 two legates, Bernard of Castanet near Toulouse and Bartholome, Abbot of Trebis, had surfaced in Lombardy, and within a year their diplomatic artfulness had succeeded in turning the situation around in favour of the Guelfs. The Tuscan Ghibellines must have been desperate to see how the Ghibelline leaders in Lombardy, the old Margrave Pallavicini and the powerful Cremonese Boso of Dovara, were brought to the point of checkmate against one another, at a time when the approaching Conradin was so in need of their support; when these legates left Cremona in July 1267, they could be well satisfied with their work, and they were shortly followed by a new legate, Filippo of Ravenna, who, they say, pronounced the excommunication of Conradin in the presence of the Pope in October of that year (but see below: the actual communication took place in April 1268). While these scholars refer to Jeanroy’s «other extensive remarks» in a footnote they do not mention
At any rate it is clear that the troubadour is directing his trenchant sarcasms at particular people and events.

CAlega’s allusion to a prophecy concerning the coming of Conradin (vv. 13-14) is echoed in a similar allusion by the Florentine Ghibelline poet Cione Baglioni. An anti-Angevin millenarianist current going back to at least 1264 was to become widely diffused in Ghibelline and spiritual circles around the figure of Frederic III of Aragon, and the fact that a Genoese and a Florentine poet could refer to it at the same time shows that it was already widespread.

Stanza VI refers to an archbishop who was brought to perjure himself because of Charles, and a seneschal who falsely swore to protect the lives of counts who were then treacherously desfait. Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora convincingly identify these counts as Bartolome and Jordan of Anglona in Piedmont who had been captured at the battle of Benevento in 1266. Jordan had played a conspicuous role as podestà of Siena under Manfred. After they had languished in the Provençal fortress of Castellane and tried unsuccessfully to escape by stabbing the guard, Charles ordered them to be sent to Aix and each have a hand and foot chopped off, an event reflected in Calega’s term desfait, which can have the particular sense of ‘mutilated’ (see the note to v. 45 below). This took place at the end of 1267; in February 1268 Charles ordered the castellan of Le Luc in Provence to take charge of them along with other prisoners in Aix captured by the seneschal of Provence. The deciding factor for Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora is that these two are always referred to as ‘the counts’, so that when the troubadour speaks of ‘counts’ everyone knew who he was talking about. As they indicate, Calega is tapping into the contempt and anger their gruesome mutilation will have aroused everywhere, especially since they were captured in honorable combat. They therefore conclude that the archbishop who gave his consent to this must be Vicedomino.

de Vicedominis of Aix (nephew of Pope Gregory X),\(^\text{16}\) and observe that it is appropriate to call him Charles’s compaire (v. 41) since he had long resided in Provence alongside Charles in Aix and was one of his keenest assistants and his diplomatic agent in northern Italy. The seneschal they identify as William l’Estendard, seneschal of Provence, who, they state, had recently been holding Piacenza for Charles with the help of 400 knights, and who was soon to make a name for himself in Sicily for his cruelty. This is no doubt confusing two men of the same name: William l’Estendard the elder was the man Charles sent to Sicily in 1268 «with the strict instructions to eradicate rebellion by putting to the sword all inhabitants of towns who refused to submit», and described by Saba Malaspina as «“a man of blood, a fearsome knight, a ferocious fighter, a savage combatant, crueller than all cruelty to those unfaithful to his king” (del Re II, p. 331)», whereas it was his son William l’Estendard the younger who was seneschal of Provence.\(^\text{17}\) From the sirventes we learn that – at least according to what Charles’s enemies in Italy were reporting – both had sworn on the soul of the King (presumably Charles) to protect the two counts from injury, an oath that melted away in the face of Charles’s order.\(^\text{18}\)

In stanza VII the troubadour mockingly accuses Charles of avarice and untrustworthiness, remarking that he is unlikely ever to repay his debts to «Lord Henry». This is Enrique of Castile, brother of King Alfonso X, who had sought his fortune in France where «he made friends with Charles, who was his first cousin, and lent him large sums for the Italian campaign. He expected to be rewarded with the Kingdom of Sardinia or with a duchy in Epirus. But Charles neither paid him back nor seemed in any hurry to gratify his ambitions. It was with resentment in his heart […] that he accepted the invitation to Rome and was installed as senator, in July 1267».\(^\text{19}\)


\(^{18}\) For Jeanroy’s earlier objection to this identification of the counts, see the note to v. 44, below.

Clement, anxious about Conradin’s ambitions and Enrique’s intentions in Rome, from where he had occupied various towns in the Campagna and was attacking some of Charles’s castles, suggested that the latter should make his peace with Enrique by paying him back the money he had borrowed from him in 1266. In mid-October Enrique declared himself openly in support of Conradin, welcoming his representative Galvano Lancia in Rome on 18 October. The Pope waited until November to denounce him formally, and finally excommunicated him in April 1267.  

According to Jeanroy, the historical circumstances of a debt owed to a count of Flanders (vv. 52-53) concern Charles’s intervention to help Gui de Dampierre to vindicate his claim to the county of Flanders, making him pay somewhat expensively for his services and his renunciation of his own claims to the county of Hainaut. Jeanroy comments that Gui recognised his debt to Charles so well that he had agreed to the marriage of his son Robert to one of Charles’s daughters, and observes that Gui was in fact indebted to Charles rather than the other way round, so the troubadour’s barb – that the King rewarded his services with arrogance and perfidy – is «plus spirituel que l’accusation n’est justifiée».  

To Jeanroy’s hypothesis Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora object that the troubadour is unlikely to be referring to events that took place as far back as the war of Hennegau in 1254, and that the relevant count is not Gui de Dampierre but his son Robert de Béthune, Charles’s son-in-law. In 1265 Robert had led the French army to Italy and fought at Benevento. The scholars state that we simply do not know to what the troubadour is referring, though it is likely that Charles’s wealthy son-in-law, whose house had Charles to thank for his help ten years previously, had lent him money in this time of urgent need – just as various potentates in his entourage were standing in for Charles with their credit – and that also any repayment after Bene-

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vento was still outstanding. These scholars also mention that half a year later Robert stood up for the captured Conradin against Charles’s jurists.\(^{22}\)

In vv. 57-58 Calega claims that Greeks and Latins can find no peace or truce with the Angevin. Jeanroy, followed by De Bartholomaeis, contests the idea that they could find no peace with the Pope (which is not the same thing, and not what the troubadour says), but consider he was expressing a widespread, justified feeling that the Pope was not interested in the Latin kingdom of Constantinople and the Greeks who might follow its unstable fortunes.\(^{23}\) Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora suggest that in his capacity of an experienced trader with the Orient our troubadour may have heard something about Charles’s secret deal in 1267 in Viterbo with the titular Latin emperor Baudouin of Constantinople against the Greek emperor Michael Palaeologus.\(^{24}\) While it was not, they remark, up to Anjou to facilitate peace between Latin and Greek Christians and to renew the struggle for the Holy Land, Charles must have made Baudouin hope that he might be able to defeat Michael, who had taken his throne, so that he could pursue his own imperial ambitions in Greece. This was likely to have been perceived in Genoa as a particularly sensitive matter, since the Genoese had just (in 1267) renewed their city’s old ties with Michael.

Runciman’s account of Charles’s Greek policy presents a clearer picture. He describes how the Angevin had inherited from Manfred the long-held aim of the kings of Sicily to found an empire in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the fourth crusade, the setting up of the Latin Empire, and the «obstinate refusal of the Greeks to accept the domination and religion of their conquerors», this aim became bound up with the idea of crusade against the Greek schismatics, an idea intensified after the collapse of the Latin Empire and the reconquest of Constantinople by the Greeks. When Charles took over from Manfred as ruler of Sicily, one of his enterprises involved «a small expedition in 1266 to take over Corfu and the mainland fortresses» that had been the dowry of Manfred’s widow, Queen Helena. The ex-emperor of Constantinople Baudouin had fixed his hopes of reconquest on Charles’s


enemy Manfred, «had found himself cold-shouldered at the court of France, once Charles’s invasion of Italy was under way», and had «returned disconsolately to Italy». At Viterbo in May 1267 Clement arranged a reconciliation between him and Charles, but Baudouin had to agree to very unfavourable terms: to confirm the Angevin’s possession of Queen Helena’s dower-lands, cede to him suzerainty over the Principality of Achaea, give him full sovereignty over nearly all the islands of the Aegean, and recompense him with a third of any territory Charles might conquer for him, with the exception of Constantinople itself. Baudouin’s son and heir Philippe was to marry Charles’s daughter Beatrice, with the stipulation that if Philippe died without heir his rights to the Empire would pass to Charles. «In return Charles promised to raise and to maintain for one year an army of two thousand knights destined for the conquest of Constantinople». Immediately after Viterbo Charles pursued various diplomatic manoeuvres with Prince William of Achaea, the Mongols, and central European leaders, negotiations with the latter leading to an eventual Angevin dynasty on the Hungarian throne.25

But the events outlined here do not really explain why Latins, as opposed to Greeks, should ‘find no peace or truce’ with Charles. Was the troubadour thinking of the war that was to take place to recapture Constantinople, which was certainly not peace for the Latins, even if it was perceived to be for their benefit? Or was he thinking of ‘Latins’ simply as all non-Greek Christians, including the Ghibellines in Italy?

So there was to be war between Christians in Greece, but peace with Saracens at home (vv. 58-64). Lucera was largely inhabited by Saracens inherited from the Hohenstaufens, who fought in Charles’s army on the shores of the Adriatic or in campaigns in Achaea. Charles had tried to attract Provençals to settle there but with limited success.26 Jeanroy observes that Calega’s castigation of Charles for granting peace to Saracens of Lucera seems absurd, since at the time of writing the Saracens of Lucera, along with the rest of the town, were in full revolt against Charles’s heavy demands for taxes, and it was Charles who, at the invitation of the Pope on 28 March 1268 to go to the aid of the Regno which they were ravaging, made his way south

from Tuscany and invested Lucera on 20 May. Jeanroy reports that it is hard to find any evidence of a peace or truce concluded between Charles and his Moslem subjects, though a letter from Clement on 11 March 1266, a few days after the victory of Benevento, announced to one of his legates that the Saracens of Lucera had surrendered to the King of Sicily. On this occasion the Saracens of Lucera promised to destroy their city walls and to convert as long as Charles only used peaceful means towards them. These promises were not kept, and Charles waged war on them two years later, when these same walls held up his army for several weeks. Jeanroy supposes that after the news of Benevento the Saracens probably thought it wise to negotiate and promised all that the victor required, in order to gain time. Charles, who had his whole kingdom to organise, probably put up with these fallacious assurances and provisionally agreed that the Saracens could freely exercise their religion. Jeanroy suggests that the troubadour supposed that the Pope had agreed to this transaction.27

Runciman’s account of what happened at Lucera gives a somewhat different picture, showing how Charles was far from being in a hurry to reach that city. He describes how on 18 October 1267, a few days after becoming senator in Rome, Enrique of Castile ceremoniously received Conradin’s envoy Galvano Lancia «with the eagle banner of the Hohenstaufen proudly flying», installed his troops in the Lateran palace, and sent a letter of welcome to Conradin. «Clement was in despair. In the vain hope of winning back Rome he waited for a month before breaking definitely with the senator. It was not till November that he formally denounced him and only the following April that he excommunicated him and all Conradin’s supporters in the city. Sicily was now in the hands of the rebels. Only Palermo and Messina were still held by Charles’s vicar, and the Saracens of Lucera had joined the revolt». But Charles insisted in staying on in Tuscany, and only marched southward from Florence in March, pausing «to visit Clement at Viterbo and receive investiture from him as Imperial Vicar of Lombardy. Once back in his Kingdom he set out against the Saracen rebels at Lucera, determined to crush them before Conradin should approach».28 If Charles was in no hurry to reach there, it makes rea-

28 Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 104-105.
sonable sense for the troubadour to say that he grants peace or truce to the Saracens in that place: even if this is not formal it represents the situation on the ground. The only contradiction with the facts, or the «absurdity» referred to by Jeanroy, would occur once news reached Genoa of Charles’s clear intention to deal with the city, which suggests that from these lines of the *sirventes* at least, it makes sense to see its *terminus ante quem* as around 20 May 1268.

From the last three stanzas it is clear that Conrado has not yet entered Rome, which he did on 24 July to the accompaniment of «scenes of hysterical enthusiasm». The references to Verona and Pavia imply that the song is unlikely to have been composed before 20 January at the earliest: a conclusion uncontested by any scholars. Runciman relates that he stayed in Verona, «the great Ghibelline city of the north», from 21 October 1267 to 17 January 1268, reaching «the second great Ghibelline city of the north, Pavia» three days later, where he remained for a few weeks, thence leaving his army to cross to Savona and sailing on 29 March to Pisa, where he arrived on 7 April, «received a constant stream of Ghibelline soldiers and Ghibelline gold», and was rejoined by his army on 2 May. Jeanroy argues that the *sirventes* was composed after he left those cities, so around the beginning of March, and that the confident tone of the poem suggests that his expedition looked promising and that there had been some successes, which leads him to believe that it cannot have been composed before March. The most striking of his successes was the defeat of the French marshal Jean de Baiselve on 25 June at Ponte-a-Valle near Florence, an event of sufficient importance, Jeanroy suggests, for the poet to have mentioned it if it had already taken place, and for this reason he proposes April or May. He adds that since Calega represents Charles as a friend of the Saracens (though as I have suggested above, ‘peace’ with Charles does not necessarily imply friendship) it would be natural to think that the song was composed before he invested Lucera on 20 May, though the poet may not have been aware of Charles’s movements. These arguments, which coincide with what I have argued so far, seem sensible if inconclusive.

Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora maintain that Calega would not have been able to attack Charles so forcefully over his failure to stop Muslim worship in Lucera if he had known that the town had rebelled against Charles and killed the French garrison on 2 February 1266 (a misprint for 1268). The Pope heard of this on 12 February in Viterbo and Genoa is likely to have learned of it shortly afterwards. So, they maintain, the *sirventes* must have been composed no later than the middle of February 1268. They go on to state that towards the end of January the news of Conradin’s welcome in Pavia on 20 January must have reached Genoa, so this also points to the beginning of February. They consider this to explain the purpose of the *sirventes*: Conradin was preparing to head for Tuscany; but would he succeed against the united efforts of the Church and their warlike vassal Charles of Sicily? It was therefore up to a passionately committed Ghibelline such as Calega to use all his powers of persuasion to deride the Guelfs and attract all those in Italy, especially those of his own city of Genoa, who were undecided, to rally to his cause. They argue that the piece can in fact only be understood in the context of Genoa’s situation, where Guelfs were in power but Ghibellines not defeated or exiled, with political and mercantile concerns criss-crossing each other. The city had long been involved in negotiations with Charles, but no conclusion had been reached as the king refused to grant the Genoese its old trading rights in the Regno. The city might have allied itself to Conradin, who would have repaid this with rich concessions, but there remained an insuperable obstacle in the old enmity with Pisa which had unhesitatingly offered him its support. The best policy seemed to be to wait. Then came the news that Conradin had reached Pavia, and the Ghibelline party in Genoa had to try to win over the Guelf opposition to the idea that an active policy was needed to assist the Staufen and get the better of the dangerous Angevin and the hated Pisa (against this it might be argued that the best way to win over Guelf opposition was not likely to be an aggressive attack on the Pope and Charles of Anjou). Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora argue that the final *tornada* points to a dating of the beginning of 1268, saying that Enrique had already fully withdrawn from Charles and had dealings with

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Conradin’s envoys, but the Pope had not yet broken off ties with him since he still hoped to hold him back from «the worst». The Ghibellines of Tuscany had no doubts about Enrique’s hostility to Charles and his inclination to ally himself to Conradin, but that was not enough for them: they wanted him to set out from Rome immediately to attack Charles or his kingdom. This is what the Genoese poet was trying to spur them on to do with his song. But, they argue, this only fits with the first months of 1268, while the Pope was still waiting before Enrique attacked the Regno. On the 5 April Clement excommunicated him. So they seem to be saying that once there was open enmity between Enrique and the Pope there would have been no point in spurring him on to action with the sirventes. Line 75 does appear to suggest that Enrique might not yet have fully and openly committed himself, though this stanza could simply be seen as giving extra encouragement.

Bertoni prudently dates the piece to the early months of 1268, but repeats his own earlier observation that when Conradin embarked for Pisa from the Genoese Portofino on 29 March 1268, various magnates of Genoa came to speak with him and honour him appropriately, and the two brothers, who were consiglieri at the time, may well have been among them: an occasion that could readily have motivated Calega’s sirventes, and indeed put him in a position to be informed of whatever Conradin knew of the Guelf actions and movements. Jeanroy claimed that the sirventes contained various historical inaccuracies, in vv. 7, 52-53 and 57-59; later research suggests that this is not, or not necessarily, correct. Partisan Calega is of course, but he appears to be well informed.

Songs attacking Charles of Anjou, of which this sirventes is a notable example, were perceived to have a significant propaganda impact and led to some draconian efforts at public censorship. Shortly after the execution of Conradin the authorities in Perugia issued a statute, dated 20 December 1268, ordaining that anyone who composed, recited or sang a song against King Charles, or spoke any insult to-

wards him, should be fined a hundred pounds of *denarii*; and if he could not pay this fine, his tongue was to be cut out, and this would be done to any *intenzantibus* (arguing? involved in *tensos*) in favour of Conradin. This prohibition was to be proclaimed once a month in both the city and the suburbs.  

Asperti argues that the song in some ways signals the end of the Ghibelline poetic tradition closely linked to Provence and north-west Italy, which expresses similar polemical attacks, in a strongly knightly environment, against the clergy and the Guelf policy of the house of France. This tradition links this policy to the ruin of the Holy Land, exemplified in Ricaut Bonomel from whom Asperti sees Calega picking up various cues. Such attacks reflect the inextricable link apparently established around the mid-13th c. in Provence and Italy between polemics against the mendicant orders and political struggles against the multifaceted Guelf party. The question then arises as to whether the apparent end of this tradition was affected by such attempts at suppression.

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35 Asperti, *Carlo I d’Angiò*, p. 65.
Calega Panzan

Ar es sazos c’om si deu alegar

(BdT 107.1)

**Ms:** a1 512-514 (en calega panza).


**Versification:** Frank, 577:97, a10 b10 b10 a10 c10’ c10’ d10 d10, ar, en, ia, anz; nine coblas unissonans and two four-line tornadas. The versification is identical to that of a *sirventes* of Berenguier Trobel 50.2, Bertran Carbonel 82.17 (*sirventes*), 82,19 (*cobla*), 82.67 (*cobla*), 82.88 (*cobla*), a *canso* of Blacasset 96.11, a *tenso* of Guiraut Riquier 248.16, a *sirventes* of Raimon Gaucelm de Beziers 401.9. Asperti, *Carlo I d’Angiò*, p. 63 suggests a close filiation between Bertran d’Alamano’s 76.8 (which he however dates to 1260 – but see Paterson, «James the Conqueror», pp. 222-229) and the *sirventes* of Ricaut Bonomel (BdT 439.1) and Calega Panzan.

**Author:** Calega Panzan was a Genoese cloth merchant from a family with Ghibelline sympathies, involved along with his brother Conrad in trade with Paris, Lagny-sur-Marne, Provins, Naples, Sicily, and Syria. He seems to have lived for over 80 years. In 1259 he was *anziano della città* and a ship’s captain, and in the late 1260s the brothers were *consiglieri* of the city (Arturo Ferretto, «Notizie intorno a Caleca Panzano trovatore genovese e alla sua famiglia (1248-1313)», *Studi di filologia romanza*, 9, 1903, pp. 595-600; Jeanroy, «Un sirventes», p. 146; Bertoni, *I trovatori d’Italia*, pp. 112-113; Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora, «Einsirventes von 1268», pp. 616-617).

**Date:** early months of 1268, perhaps 29 March.
I. Now is the time for rejoicing and for false clergy to bewail their decline and their long-standing pride, their deceit and their false preaching. Ah, traitors! You cause Tuscany and Lombardy to be cut to pieces, yet you feel no grief for Syria: over there you have a truce with Turks and Persians so that here you can slaughter French and Germans!

II. Anyone who can lie or speak falsely or is familiar with duplicity or double-dealing is instantly made into a legate, and it’s plain enough to the people of Cremona whether I’m telling the truth; but their shady deals and their vast skulduggery have run their course, in accordance with the prophecy, for God is not willing to tolerate their ruses any further, and wants to deflate the arrogance of the French.

III. Anyone who feels like killing or lives by rapine can win salvation quickly and easily as long as he comes to kill a hundred Christians, and if he...
e qí’s volgues d’aucir mil esforzar
em Paradis en l’auzor luec seria.
Ai, clergue fals! Laissat aves la via
e’ls mandamenz qe Dieus fes pur e sanz,
e Moyzes, cant escrius los comanz.

IV  Si Sainz Bernatz fos en vida, levar
si pogra tost e complir son talan
e la Gleiza el primier estamen
de paupertat vezer, e refuzar
las vanitatz, si con el temps fazia
de Saint Peire, qi los contragz gueria
e pescava armas e non bezanz,
e soanet delieg e pres afanz.

V   Al rei Carle degra tostemps membrar
con el fon prez ab son frair’eisamen
per Serrazis, e trobet chauzimen
assas meillor qe non pogro trobar
a Saint Eler qi forfait non avia
li Cristian; aïlas! q’en un sol dia
pezeiron Frances petitz e granz
ni la maire salvet neis sos enfanz.

felt like forcing himself to kill a thousand he would win the highest seat of Paradise. Ah, false clergy! You have left the path and the rules made pure and holy by God, and by Moses when he wrote down the commandments!

IV. Were St Bernard alive, he could soon rise up to fulfil his dream and see the Church in its original state of poverty, repudiating the vanities, as it used to do in the days of St Peter who cured the crippled, fishing for souls rather than gold pieces, scorning pleasure and embracing suffering.

V. King Charles ought always to bear in mind how he was captured by the Saracens along with his brother, and how he was met with much greater clemency than the Christians were able to find at Sant’Ellero, which had committed no crime. Alas! in a single day the French cut great and small to pieces, and mothers could not even save their children.
VI. He let his accomplice the archbishop perjure himself in a most solemn oath, and the seneschal too, who swore on the king’s soul that the counts would be safeguarded, and they were unjustly and criminally mutilated. Ah! how foolish is anyone who puts himself in his power! I therefore beseech God to confound such a king who has never kept faith since he was seven years old.

VII. If Lord Enrique wished to recover what is his from King Charles, even if he were to lend him the rest (of his resources), he would be repaid afterwards with absolutely nothing, for after the count of Flanders’ conquest he (Charles) had him requited with arrogance and perfidy. I know he would not pay him in any other coin, as he was tight-fisted as count and twice as stingy now he is king, and doesn’t give tuppence (two gloves) for the whole world.

VIII. Neither Greek nor Latin can find truce or peace with him, but the heathen dogs of Luchera had it exactly to their liking, and they can happily cry «Mahomet!» at the tops of their voices for now there is no monastery of
q’ar jes de Dieu ni de Sancta Maria
no’i a mostier, qe non o suffriria
l’apostolis q’a mes en gran balanz
la fe de Dieu – don sui meravillianz.

IX  L’aut rei Conrat, qi ven per castiar
los fals pastors e liurar a turmen –
q’an laissat Deu per aur e per argen,
e qi del tort fan dreit qi’ls vol pagar –
mantengua Dieus, e lur gran simonia
confond’en brieu, si q’en la segnoria
c[o]itar del rei los deleials trafanz,
e qe vencut fassan totz sos comanż.

X  Si don Enrics fo traïtz per clercia
ni per Frances chiflatz, ben si deuria
venjar d’amdos e non esser dupanz
de baissar els e lur faitz mal estanz.

XI  Lo rei Conrat e sa gran baronia
e Gibelis e Veron’e Pavia
mantengua Dieus, e Frances e Normanz
met’al desotz, e clergues malananz.

67 aur] auer  68 qals  69 mantegua dieu  71 titan del reis  80 de sotz;
clegues

God or St Mary there, as the Pope, who has placed the faith of God in great jeopardy, would not allow it – which astounds me.

IX. God support the noble King Conrad, who is coming to chastise and deliver up to torment the false shepherds who have abandoned God for gold and silver, and who make wrong into right for anyone who pays them. May He soon put an end to their widespread simony, so that He may presently harry the disloyal traitors into the power of the King, and so that once conquered they obey all his commands.

X. If Lord Enrique was betrayed by the clergy and abused by the French, he certainly ought to avenge himself against both and not be fearful of crushing them and their disgraceful actions.

XI. God keep King Conrad and his great barony, and the Ghibellines and Verona and Pavia, and bring down the French and Normans and the corrupt clergy.
1. MS _alegrar_; the emendation _alegrar_ adopted by previous editors is paleographically and semantically satisfactory here but repetition of this rhyme-word in 25 is suspect: see below.

2. Schultz-Gora (review of Jeanroy, p. 471) rejected _caïmen_ which was otherwise unknown to him and suggested correcting to _traïmen_ («Verrat» in Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora). Bertoni 1915, p. 175 suggests it may be a Genoese form from Genoese _caïr, cai_ (ca[d]ire), «e, se lo consideriamo come uno di quegli ibridismi pei quali acquistano una loro speciale fisionomia le liriche provenzali di alcuni trobatori italiani, troveremo che no v’è ragione di non attenersi al codice». It is uncertain whether this refers to their moral decadence (which would be in line with what immediately follows) or the decline in their fortunes as the Ghibellines gain in strength (Bertoni 1915 «il loro decadere», Riquer «decadencia», Cavaliere «decadimento»).

5. For the form _deleial_, corrected by Jeanroy and Bertoni, compare 71 here. The lyric example on _COM2_ (BdT 330.9, 15, _per deleial captenensa_ (Peire Bremon Ricas Novas, ed. Jean Boutière, Toulouse 1930, XVI) is erroneous.

6. Jeanroy corrects _del_ to _cal_; Schultz-Gora (also Bertoni, Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora), more economically, _dol._

12. As Bertoni notes, the sense could also be «appare da quanto si vede avvenire ai Cremonesi» (i.e. ‘is apparent from what happened to the Cremonesi’).

15. _Pace_ Bertoni 1915, the MS clearly has _lurs_.

16. _For_ _lor_ as a type of pleonasm see the note on p. 585 of Bertoni 1915.


19. Jeanroy, Bertoni 1915 _veng’aucir;_ the correction of MS _a merce_ to _un cen_ is from Jeanroy (also Bertoni 1915).


25-31. Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora suggest that this stanza is probably ironic, as even if Conradin won the troubadour could hardly be under the illusion that there would be a complete regeneration of the Church.

25. Bertoni corrects to _Bernartz_. — The rhyme-word _alegrar_, accepted by previous editors, is suspect (see note 1), especially as there is no reason after stanza III for St Bernard to be joyful. De Bartholomaeis (p. 252) suggests it is ironic. A scribal error may have occurred as a result of a blotched letter and eyeskip or guesswork. St Bernard was responsible for preaching the second crusade of 1147, and as a Cistercian sought to revert to the simple apostolic way of life. It is not known whether the reference is to any particular pronouncement on his part, though Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora (p. 628, n. 1) suggest it is to «de moribus et officio episcoporum» citing Elphège Va-
candard, *La vie de Saint Bernard, abbé de Clairvaux*, I, 203. The edition to which I have access does not show this.


31. Literally a Byzantine gold coin.

34. Corrections Jeanroy, Bertoni. Schultz-Gora considered MS *frar* as an italianism that could be allowed to stand.


37-38. Jeanroy prints *qil*, an emendation rightly rejected by Schultz-Gora. But his correction of MS *Cler* to *Eler* is unquestionably right. Sternfeld and Schultz-Gora took the subject of sg. *avia* to be pl. *li Christian*, commenting «Im Texte steht hier der Singular, indessen lässt sich die provenzalische Konstruktion nicht nachbilden, wenn man nicht undeutsch werden will. Der Sinn wird auch so nicht geändert»; Bertoni rightly understood it as *Saint Eler*.


40. Jeanroy suppletes *no la maire [non]* but suggests *Ni la m. salvet neis s. e.* in a note, adopted by Bertoni, *Trovatori d’Italia*, and Riquer. The singular *la maire* functions as a general idea.

41-45. For the particular sense of *desfai* see *LR*, III, 275, «Los contrafags e los lebros e’ls desfag de lurs membres», V. et Vert., fol. 92; compare «avía un malanant de laja lebrosia, / desfach d’uehllz e de cara, que parllar non podia; / de las mans e dels pes mant det li son cassug», *La Vida de Sant Honorat*, ed. Peter T. Ricketts with the collaboration of Cyril P. Hershon, Turnhout 2007, 3326-28).

42. Correction Jeanroy.

43. Corrections Bertoni.

47-48. Schultz-Gora’s suggested punctuation (comma after 47) on the grounds that 48 is expletive rather than relative has not met with acceptance, and makes *aital* hard to explain.Jeanroy corrects to *fes*. The graphy *fez* is found in *BdT* 434.9, 28-29, MS *C* (Cerv, ed. Martín de Riquer, *Obras completas del trovador Cerverí de Girona*, Barcelona 1947, CIV), «ni menassars a mollers quan mal fan, / ni bona fez ab malvatz mescrezens», and *Girart de Roussillon*, ed. W. Mary Hackett, 3 vols., Paris 1953-1955, 2410, «a vint mil Agians qui’n portent fez». Seven was considered the age of reason.

50. Riquer translates *l remanen* as «lo que le queda».

53. Correction Jeanroy, Bertoni; Bertoni does not record a variant.

54. Correction Jeanroy.

59. MS *nucheira*: The form Nuceria for Luchera, a newly built fortress town in the Regno, is frequent in Latin medieval texts (Jeanroy, p. 160, n. 4).
60. This is likely to refer to the call to worship rather than a warcry.

61. Supplementation Jeanroy, Bertoni.

64-65. Bertoni reads the crossed-out word as *sen*. Jeanroy corrects to *meravillanz*. Vatteroni suggests (p. 162, n. 16) that although there is no historical confirmation of this accusation, there may have been an agreement between Charles and the Moslems after the victory of Benevento, though it is unclear what this has to do with the Pope.

67. Jeanroy corrects to *D[i]eu*. Correction of *auer* to *aur*, Jeanroy and Bertoni.

68. Correction Jeanroy, Bertoni.

69. Correction Jeanroy, Bertoni.

70. Jeanroy corrects to *segnoria*.

71. Correction to MS *deleials* Jeanroy, Bertoni. Jeanroy and Bertoni emend MS *titan* to *torne*. Jeanroy found the *i* a doubtful reading, but it is clear on my copy; my suggestion *coitar* is paleographically closer than *torne*. I follow their correction of MS *reis*. For other examples of *coitar* ‘to press, hurry’ (*PD* «presser, hâter, pousser», see *Crotzada*, 137.9-12, «E combaton Murel tot entorn per totz latz, / Que dins la vila nova son tuit essems intratz, / E’ls Frances que lai eran an de guiza coitatz / Que el cap del castel s’en son trastotz pujatz» (*el* corrected to *el* on *COM*); *Girart de Roussillon*, ed. Hackett, 5391-5392, «E veng[em] los coitant dinz Cornellon, / E coilli les Girauz en sa mauson», and glossary.

79. Jeanroy prints *manteng(u)a*.


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